



DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
2000 NAVY PENTAGON
WASHINGTON, DC 20350-2000

IN REPLY REFER TO

OPNAVINST 1500.57A
N869
3 August 1999

OPNAV INSTRUCTION 1500.57A

From: Chief of Naval Operations

Subj: SURFACE WARFARE TRAINING STRATEGY

Ref: (a) Forward...From the Sea; the Navy Operational
Concept, Mar 97
(b) The Director of Surface Warfare (N86) Surface
Warfare Vision, May 99
(c) OPNAVINST 1500.76 (NOTAL)
(d) OPNAVINST 1500.51B (NOTAL)
(e) CNO ltr Ser N869/9U654332 of 25 May 99
(NOTAL)
(f) COMNAVSURFLANT/COMNAVSURFPACINST 3502.2D

1. Purpose. To provide a vision, strategy and actions required for effective and efficient Surface Warfare training through the year 2010 and beyond. This instruction is a substantial revision and should be reviewed in its entirety.
2. Cancellation. OPNAVINST 1500.57.
3. References. Reference (a) establishes a Navy vision and sets Navy direction for operational primacy. Reference (b) states the Surface Warfare Vision for the 21st Century. Reference (c) establishes policies and procedures and assigns responsibilities for Navy training ashore, pier-side and afloat. Reference (d) states broad Navy wide training policy and procedures. Reference (e) is a letter to NAVSEA and Program Offices addressing optimized manning requirements and human system integration in design of ships and systems. Reference (f) (SURFTRAMAN) provides guidance for the conduct of the Surface Force training program for all ships and units of the Naval Surface Forces.
4. Background. Worldwide events during the last decade have led to high level discussions of the national military strategy and a series of force structure reviews which have ultimately resulted in a smaller surface force. At the same time, changing threats, new and evolving missions and advanced technologies have raised the premium on each

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individual surface ship and Sailor. Reference (a) states "...the primary purpose of forward-deployed naval forces is to project American power from the sea to influence events ashore in the littoral regions of the world across the operational spectrum of peace, crises and war." Reference (b) states "...the surface navy will be an offensive maritime force. From a foundation of maritime dominance, we will ensure entry into the 21st century joint battlespace through the twin missions of land attack and theater air dominance. The surface navy will be interoperable with joint forces in netcentric C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) and provide maritime force protection, precision strike and sea-based artillery and theater air and ballistic missile defense to air, land, and sea elements of the joint task force." As these missions evolve in an austere fiscal environment new demands will be levied on the surface force. The key to success in meeting these demands will remain in the hands of the Navy's most valuable asset, its people.

Accordingly, more than ever before, Navy ships must be optimally manned and crews optimally trained. Optimal manning is defined as just the right number of personnel assigned duties to perform all the missions for which the ship is designed, no more and no less. Optimal manning is not minimum manning, in that the ship is designed and constructed from the keel up around the crew to perform its intended function. Optimal training is defined as the Sailor arriving aboard having received just the right amount of training that allows him or her to step in to the job as soon as possible to minimize turnover time and over-tasking of other crew members while the Sailor learns his or her job. Optimal manning demands optimal training.

5. Vision. To ensure optimal manning and training the Surface Warfare Training Vision defines an architecture that:

- a. Encompasses the evolving warfare requirements and missions for the legacy fleet as well as new ships (LPD 17 and DD 21).
- b. Enables fleet operational readiness by producing an officer and enlisted community able to significantly contribute to all naval, joint and combined operations.
- c. Places a premium on and acknowledges the value of the individual.
- d. Promotes core values and community culture and tradition.

6. Assumptions. Evolving missions, technological change and fiscal realities lead to several fundamental assumptions:

- a. Resources. Manpower and training will compete with other Surface Warfare requirements in an environment of limited resources. To ensure future operational readiness, training requirements must be fully integrated in the acquisition process and properly funded. Per reference (c), program managers have a special obligation to ensure unique training is funded early and adequately within their programs, and throughout program life cycle.

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b. Manning. To achieve optimal manning, a top down functional analysis must be conducted on all shipboard and system functions early in the design process. Trades must be conducted among technology, people, resources and assigned tasks based on the spectrum of analysis. Crew size should be limited to only essential billets. Once optimal manning is achieved, manpower, distribution and training systems must ensure all billets remain filled with properly trained crewmembers.

c. Operating new and legacy ships together. New and legacy ships will continue to operate together for the foreseeable future and must be fully interoperable and compatible. Supporting infrastructure must evolve and modernize to provide compatibility and maximum support for both new and legacy ships.

d. Electronic Connectivity. Training will be available from a myriad of external sources as well as new tools embedded in shipboard operating systems. Electronic connectivity at sea and ashore during all phases of operations will be essential to surface warfare training.

e. New and expanding warfare areas. Land Attack, Theater Air Defense and Network Centric Warfare are evolving or new concepts and mission areas. In general, the requirement for Information Superiority will expand dramatically in the near future. Training (particularly billet specialty and team training) must be in place to meet these new mission requirements.

f. Acquisition process. New acquisition processes are shifting much of the initial conceptualization through detailed design of new ships and systems to private industry. The sequence of developing manpower and training plans to support an acquisition within this new process may require modification. However, the intent of reference (c), which provides comprehensive guidance for training requirements associated with new acquisition, remains relevant.

7. Strategy. The Navy must obtain the maximum benefit from the limited resources (both dollar and people) available now and in the future. The following guidance builds on the requirements of references (b) and (d) to accomplish this goal:

a. People. The crew is the most valuable shipboard “system”. As discussed in reference (e), the Navy must design ships and systems around its people. This concept, referred to as “Human Centered Design” is necessary to realize system efficiency and establishes a point of departure for more effective and efficient training. As shipboard functions change in parallel with new and evolving missions, the Navy must identify new skill mixes and invest in training to support them. Once trained, the Navy must ensure an environment that promotes retention of these valuable people as a primary business decision. As crew size becomes smaller, the premium on each individual rises.

b. Training. The requirement to conduct initial training ashore remains, but it must be improved with new technology and better tailoring. Initial training comprises recruit

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training, “A” schools and certain “C” schools for enlisted, and accession training and Surface Warfare Officer School for officers. Through detailed billet task analyses, the Navy can build a more tailored core/strand/specialty training track which will have the net effect of more efficient use of resources (time, dollars and training space) and better trained graduates. New instructional techniques and delivery methods will augment or replace “C” school and specialty training courses as appropriate. Some new specialty courses will be required for new ships as well as the new and expanded warfare areas. Advances in onboard, embedded and distance supported training technologies will dramatically improve on-the-job training (OJT) and onboard continuing training and ensure crew members retain skills which rapidly atrophy if not routinely exercised. Continuing training not only encompasses proficiency training, but also “currency training” which systematically pushes all technical and procedural changes and fleet-wide lessons learned to the ship(and school house). This will ensure every Sailor receives current, accurate and relevant training. These advances will support the tactical training strategy, the content of the reference (f) and the Inter-deployment training cycle. In order to support these advances, new technologies must be supportive of, and compliant with, a single integrated shipboard training architecture. Stovepiping of training systems without concern for compatibility and interoperability with existing and future shipboard training systems will not be supported.

c. Distance support and supporting infrastructure. As the Navy moves to optimal manning, selected shipboard functions will move ashore. Accordingly, shore support sites must provide robust, online support across a wide range of functional areas. Distance support will require investment in communication equipment and satellite connectivity as well as a review of bandwidth allocation and cost. To optimize the infrastructure to provide distance support will require a top down functional analysis similar to that discussed in paragraph 6b. As the “full service contractor” concept evolves within the framework of acquisition reform, the interrelationship with extant Navy support will be critical to ensure compatibility.

d. Cultural and community issues. A high level review of Surface Navy cultural and community issues continues. Cultural and community issues that impact manpower and training, particularly for optimally manned ships and systems, will be closely reviewed and, where necessary, guidance will be provided by the Director of Surface Warfare.

8. Action. The following actions are required for proper execution of the Surface Warfare Training Strategy:

a. Director of Surface Warfare Division (N86): N86, in support of the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Resources, Warfare Requirements and Assessments) (N8), acts as both program and resource sponsor for training systems and functions associated with this strategy. Additionally, N86 is responsible for the following:

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(1) Early development of mission need statements (MNS) and operational requirements documents (ORD) in support of the Navy and Surface Warfare Vision and the integration of this training strategy.

(2) Programming manpower and resources in accordance with Navy Planning, Programming and Budgeting System (PPBS) and integrated warfare architecture (IWAR) analysis for proper execution of this strategy.

(3) Reviewing all new surface warfare systems to ensure manpower, personnel and training (MPT) requirements are adequately defined early in the developmental process.

(4) Providing oversight and direction to surface warfare acquisition programs to ensure a common approach is applied to MPT issues.

(5) Programming and budgeting to satisfy the above requirements with special priority placed on fully funding those N86 initiatives that institutionalize the value of people.

(6) Effective execution of those roles and responsibilities assigned to program sponsors and resource sponsors in section 9 of reference (c) and, in particular the initiation, development, approval and life cycle management of appropriate Navy Training System Plans (NTSP).

(7) Coordinating with other Chief of Naval Operations codes to promote this strategy and in particular with:

(a) Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower and Personnel) (N1) to ensure manpower accounts are fully funded and the distribution system improved such that all ships are properly manned at all times. This implies that optimally manned ships will be manned at 100 percent throughout their operational cycle.

(b) Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics) (N4) to ensure infrastructure investment decisions are made that will guarantee compatibility, interoperability and supportability of both new and legacy ships.

(c) Director, Space, Information Warfare, Command and Control (N6) to ensure coordinated development of C4I systems that support distance supported learning and training.

(d) Director of Naval Training (N7) to improve and better tailor initial training ashore and support initiatives in onboard, embedded and distance supported training technologies that will enhance onboard OJT and continuing training.

(e) Other N8 Warfare codes to share MPT initiatives that support effective and efficient resource utilization, and in particular with the Director of Aviation Warfare (N88) to obtain MPT efficiencies in the area of aviation operations from surface ships.

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b. Systems Commanders (SYSCOM), Program Executive Officers (PEO), and Program Managers (PM). SYSCOMs, PEOs and PMs are responsible for:

(1) Developing, fielding and providing life cycle support for training systems that support this strategy per reference (e).

(2) Developing new systems and all related training support using a “Human Centered Design” philosophy per reference (e), employing a top down mission and functional analysis approach to ensure training requirements are designed into systems.

(3) Taking an integrated approach to system development to avoid inefficient, uncoordinated and costly MPT “Stovepipes”.

(4) Working with training system developers to ensure state of the art (commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) where appropriate) advances and technologies are applied that promote more effective and efficient adult learning and improved retention in school house initial training.

(5) Working with the fleet to ensure on board, embedded and distance supported training systematically builds on initial training and also supports joint training requirements and interoperability with these systems. Additionally, onboard training and trainers must be interoperable and compatible with existing systems and must be designed to support valid fleet requirements.

(6) Detailed execution of those roles and responsibilities assigned to SYSCOMs, PEOs and PMs (including Training Support Agency and Development Agency) in section 9 of reference (c) and in particular programming and budgeting resources for unique, initial curricula and training materials development (billet specialty training) and to develop, procure, deliver, install, overhaul and modernize other training equipment identified in the NTSP.

c. Principal Development Activity. If other than a systems commander, execute the actions normally assigned to SYSCOM, PEO or PM.

d. Chief of Naval Education and Training (CNET). CNET is responsible for the planning and execution of those roles and responsibilities assigned to the Training Agency in section 9 of reference (c) and, in particular, active participation with the resource sponsor and program manager throughout the NTSP process in support of this strategy.

e. Training Agent. Where the training agent is other than CNET, execute the actions normally assigned to CNET.

f. Fleet Commanders in Chief (FLTCINC). FLTCINCs, through their Type Commanders, Immediate Superiors in Command and Afloat Training Groups or other

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designated representative, shall fully participate in the implementation of this strategy and are responsible for the following:

(1) Early identification of requirements and the communication of those requirements to the resource sponsor and program manager in support of this strategy and fleet needs.

(2) Planning, programming and executing a tactical training strategy that builds on this strategy.

(3) Supporting those functions assigned to Fleet Project Teams in section 9 of reference (c).

(4) Authoritative oversight of training functions under their cognizance to ensure maintenance of high standards in the execution of this strategy.

(5) FLTCINCs, as the final customer, must provide timely and thorough assessment of the actions in 8a through 8e. Identification of inadequate resources and training standards is essential to the execution of this strategy.

//signed//

M. G. MULLEN

Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy

Director, Surface Warfare Division

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